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DREAMS, VISIONS AND EPICUREAN GODS 
 
 
The Epicureans, far from being atheists, did believe in gods, and were atheistic 
only in the sense that they did not believe in the gods that society at large 
accepted—the orthodox, traditional Olympians of Hesiod and Homer.1 However, the 
evidence that the Epicureans put forward as demonstrating the existence of their 
gods is curious, and has since, justifiably, been the subject of ridicule. The evidence 
is encapsulated by the term πρόληψις, which comes from the Greek προλαµβάνω, 
meaning ‘to take beforehand’ or ‘to obtain first’.2 
It is perhaps most famously Cicero who conveys this term, through his 
Epicurean spokesman Gaius Velleius, in the De natura deorum. Velleius says that 
“such notions Epicurus designates by the word prolepsis, that is, a sort of 
preconceived mental picture of a thing … [although] Epicurus himself 
employed the word prolepsis in a sense in which no one had ever used it 
before.”3  
 
What notions are these? That “gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a 
conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For what nation or what tribe of men 
is there but possesses untaught some ‘preconception’ of the gods?”4 Velleius 
continues, that  
“it [this preconception] is perceived not by the senses but by the mind … by 
our perceiving images owing to their similarity and succession, because an 
endless train of precisely similar images arises from the innumerable atoms 
and streams to us from the gods, our mind with the keenest feelings of 
pleasure fixes its gaze on these images, and so attains an understanding of a 
being both blessed and eternal.”5 
                                                
1 As asserted in Obbink (1989). 
2 Liddell & Scott (1997, 593). 
3 “Quam appellat πρόληψιν Epicurus, id est anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem” 
(DND I.16). 
4 “Esse deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Quae est 
enim gens aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam 
deorum?” (DND I.16). The translations used can be found in the bibliography. 
5 “Non sensu sed mente cernantur…sed imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis, cum 
infinita simillumarum imaginum series ex innumerabilibus individuis existat et ad deos adfluat, 
cum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagines mentem intentam infixamque nostram 
intellegentiam capere quae sit et beata natura et aeterna” (DRN I.49). 
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The notion, though, can be traced back to the fragments of Epicurus, if one is 
wary of Cicero’s testimony. In his letter to Menoeceus, he writes that “gods there are, 
since the knowledge of them is by clear vision […] (for the statements of the many 
about the gods) are not conceptions derived from sensation,”6 using Bailey’s 
translation of πρόληψις. Epicurus implies then that his concept of gods does derive 
from sensation. 
Other testimony is available in support of the above, describing πρόληψις 
without using the term though: Aetius writes that “Epicurus [says that] the gods are 
anthropomorphic and can be contemplated by reason as a result of the fineness of 
the nature of their images.”7 Sextus Empiricus writes that “since large 
anthropomorphic images strike them while they sleep they [Epicureans] supposed 
that some such anthropomorphic gods also existed in reality.”8 Demetrius Lacon 
writes that the mind “has direct apprehension of the same things,”9 in his book De 
forma dei, On the Form of God10. And there is a scholion in Diogenes Laertius, where 
the biographer writes that  
“elsewhere he [Epicurus] says that the gods are discernible by reason alone, 
some being numerically distinct, while others result uniformly from the 
continuous influx of similar images directed to the same spot and in human 
form.”11 
 
What of those two Epicurean heavyweights of the first century BC, Philodemus 
and Lucretius? In his De pietate, On piety,12 Philodemus writes of “the object of 
thought as a thing perceived in relation to a solid body … understanding perception 
that can be grasped by corporeal sensation, which they [early humans] also knew to 
                                                
6 “θεοὶ µὲν γὰρ εἰσίν· ἐναργὴς γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ γνῶσις…οὐ γὰρ προλήψεις εἰσὶν” (123-4). 
7 Text 106: Aetius 1.7.34 = Dox. Gr. P. 306 (355 U), in Inwood & Gerson and Hutchinson 
(1994, 96). 
8 Text 105: Sextus M 9.25 (353 U), in Inwood, Gerson and Hutchinson (1994, 96). 
9 “διὰ] τοῦτο δ' ὁµ[ο]ίων ἔχει κατάληψιν.” 
10 P.Herc. 1055. 
11 Lives of Eminent Philosophers X.139. 
12 P. Herc. 1428. 
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be derived from a physical entity;”13 and that “in truth declared […] affairs […] the 
images were true.”14 In his De signis, On methods of inference,15 he writes that  
“he who recalls that mental perceptions occur in this circumstance, namely, 
apart from perceptions and present objects, and he who says that it is 
doubtful whether this occurrence comes about through images or is 
illusionary, will not prove that these perceptions are not what they appear. 
Images can exist either by chance or as products of solid bodies, but they 
cannot be false.”16  
 
And also that “we should refer our notion of the gods to the revelations which take 
place by mental perception and which guarantee clearly that heavenly and eternal 
beings exist.”17 Lacy (1941: 204) comments on this that “although the extant 
fragments of Philodemus’ treatise on the gods contain no sure mention of this 
πρόληψις, it very probably lies behind his references to their bliss and immortality.” 
In his De rerum natura, On the nature of things, Lucretius writes that  
“the truth is that even in those days the generations of men used to see with 
waking mind, and still more in sleep, gods conspicuous in beauty, and of 
marvellous bodily stature … because there was always a succession of 
visions coming up in which the shape remained the same.”18  
 
Further he says “the nature of the gods, being thin and far removed from our senses, 
is hardly seen by the mind’s intelligence; and since it eludes the touch and impact of 
                                                
13 “οσλο[... ... .]πα[... ... .]ς ν[...]ς[... .]των των [...]νων µηδ[... .]σι παρετι[... .]µενον τὸ µ[ὴ ...]τον 
εἶναι νοε[πὸν αἰσ]θανὸµενόν τ'εἰς τὸ στερέµ[...]ηµα ἔχειν αυτ[...] δ[ια]νοουµένους τὴν 
παραισθήσει σαρκ[ί]νηι περιληπτὴν αἴσ[θη]σιν, ἣν καὶ ἀπ[ὸ] φύ]σεως ἔγ[νωσ]αν 
ε[ἰσ]αυαπέµπεσθαι” (15). 
14 “οισθ' ὑπα[ρχ... .]των [... ... ...] κατ' ἀλή[θει]α[ν...] ἀπεφα[ιν... ...] ὑποζωµ[... ...] ὅλης αυτ[... 
...]να πραγµα[... .] τὰς φαντασ[ίας ἀλήθεις εἶναι ” (24). 
15 P.Herc 1065. 
16 “ὁ µν[ηµονεύων] σὺν τούτῳ [γ]ε[ί]νε[σθαι τὰς τῆ]ς διανοίας φαντασία[ς σὺν τῷ µὴ] διὰ τῶν 
αἰσθήσεων κα[ὶ τῶν πα]ρόντων αὐτὰς γεννᾶαθ[αι, εἴ]τε ὑπ' ε[ἰδώ]λων τ[οῦτ'] ἢ κεν[όν] τι τὸ 
γεν[νηθέν], ἀµφ[ίβο]λον εἶν]αι λέγων, [δείξ]ει ταύ[τας οὐ]χ ἃς φαί[νεσθ' ὑπάρχειν], εἴ[τ]ε 
α[ὐτοµά]τω[ς φύντα εἴδωλα], δυν[ατ]ὸν εἶν[αι, ψευδεῖς δὲ] οὐ δ[υνατόν...ἔλαβεν [...ὀ]ρθῶς [...] 
νοµ[...]” (Fr. VI, in De Lacy, 1941, 116-9).” 
17 “[τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἐπί[νοια]ν δεῖν ἐπανάγε[ιν ἐπὶ τὰ πε]ριληπτικῶς τῇ [διανοίᾳ γι[νό]µενα 
κατε[ν]αρ[γ]ή[µατ', ἃ δια[σαφ]εῖ προσανῷς τὸ δ[αιµόνια καὶ] ἀίδια [ζῷα εἶναι]” (Fr. VIII, in De 
Lacy, 1941, 118-9). 
18 “Quippe etenim iam tum divom mortalia saecla 
egregias animo facies vigilante videbant, 
et magis in somnis mirando corporis auctu… 
aeternamque dabant vitam, quia semper eorum 
subpeditabatur facies et forma manebat” (DRN V.1169-1176). 
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the hands, it cannot possibly touch anything that we can touch; for that cannot touch 
which cannot be touched itself […] being thin in accord with their bodies.”19 
To summarise the ancient testimony to this point, the Epicureans assert that all 
humans have a preconception of the gods. This is not something learnt, but 
something that everyone acquires naturally and independently. This is the only 
evidence that the Epicureans assert for proof of the existence of the gods, that 
although peoples might grow up distinctly and apart, all acquire this same 
preconception. 
According to Obbink (1995: 196), “in Book XII of On Nature he [Epicurus] is 
reported to have said that the first humans originally formed ideas of the gods as 
existing, but later contaminated these with ideas about fear and death,” which is 
religio, superstition, expounded by priests and leaders for financial gain and control. 
This original and pure image of divinity can only be perceived by the mind, given the 
nature of the gods and their images. 
At this juncture a reminder of Epicurean physics20 and their explanation of 
vision21 would be useful. The Epicureans believed that things come about, are 
created, by the collisions and thus compounding of atoms. Such atoms, even when 
compounded, are in continual motion, and so the compounds themselves are 
continually losing atoms, whilst also replenishing themselves at the same time. The 
atoms on the outside of the compound are of course most liable to be lost, through 
continual collisions from without, and it is these atoms, or rather thin films of these 
atoms, that escape and then come to collide with the sensitive eye, and thus allow 
                                                
19 “tenvis enim natura deum longeque remota 
sensibus ab nostris animi vix mente videtur; 
quae quoniam manuum tactum suffugit et ictum, 
tactile nil nobis quod sit contingere debet; 
tangere enim non quit quod tangi non licet ipsum […] 
tenues de corpore eorum” (DRN V.148-154). 
20 DRN I.1021ff 
21 DRN IV.230ff 
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sight. However, there are various types of atoms, or rather, atoms of varying size and 
shape, within limits.22 The atoms that come to make up mind and soul, and indeed 
gods, are said to be the slightest, lightest and swiftest of atoms,23 and so it is that 
these are undetectable to the eye, but can only be detected by that most sensitive 
organ, the mind itself.24 
To return to Cicero then, and his derision of Epicureanism, his Academic 
spokesman Gaius Cotta mockingly labels these gods “shadow-deities”25 and “empty 
imaginations,”26 writing of images for men to worship and asking whether these 
images were different to others, like unbidden dreams and purposeful thoughts. This 
charge seems justifiable, valid and fair, against what is the only evidence which the 
Epicureans assert for the existence of their gods, so it is especially interesting to 
consider what the Epicureans might write on this. 
Two very closely related Epicurean theories must be included at this point, on 
dreams and on ghosts. Lucretius writes of being “buried in sleep, [so that] we seem 
to see and to hear in very presence those who have encountered death, whose 
bones rest in earth’s embrace.”27 This can also be extended to day-dreams, as 
Lucretius writes that “even while awake they seem to perceive dancers swaying their 
supple limbs.”28 As to why this is, and why such dreams of ghosts, and monsters 
even, are false, Lucretius writes that “certainly no image of a Centaur comes from 
one living, since there never was a living thing of this nature; but when the images of 
man and horse meet by accident, they easily adhere at once, as I said before, on 
                                                
22 DRN II.333fff. 
23 DRN III.177ff. 
24 Epicurus’ theory on vision is to be found in his Letter to Herodotus, 46a-52, and indeed on 
soul 63-68. 
25 “Adumbratorum deorum” (I.75). 
26 “Motum animi…inanem” (I.106). 
27 “somnoque sepultis, 
cernere uti videamur eos audireque coram, 
morte obita quorum tellus amplectitur ossa” (DRN I.133-5). 
28 “etiam vigilantes ut videantur 
cernere saltantis et mollia membra moventis” (DRN IV.979-80). 
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account of their fine nature and thin texture.”29 What, then, is the difference between 
visions of gods and these dreams and apparitions? 
In two fragments from his inscription, Diogenes of Oenoanda writes of feeling  
gladness from them [visions of gods] because we are asleep. So he says that these 
are not empty shades since so much power belongs to them as well. On the other 
hand, if they are not empty, they certainly do not possess sensation and reasoning 
and really speak to us ... for it is impossible for these (abilities) to belong to thin 
membranes in this way, membranes which do not possess the depth of a solid 
nature. So these men are misled in opposite ways, I mean the Stoics and 
Democritus. For the Stoics take away from the images even the power that they do 
have, while Democritus bestows on them a power they do not have;30 
 
and that the “images [in sleep] are not then empty figments of the imagination, as the 
Stoics claim. For indeed if they call them empty for the reason that although they do 
have a bodily nature yet it is extremely thin and does not impinge on the senses, then 
the expression they employ is wrong since these too, thin as they are, should have 
been called ‘makers of visible shapes’. But if they are so thin that they do not have a 
bodily nature at all—which is what they really want to say rather than the former—
how can the empty be depicted if it does not even exist? Images do indeed have a 
thin constitution and one that has escaped our sight.”31 And so for Diogenes of 
Oenoanda, there is no confusing the visions of gods with dreams or ghosts, in that 
such confusion would deprive these gods of their inherent power. 
But there are further issues to be considered. Firstly, in Lucretius’ exposition of 
soul, he writes that “we see the mind liable to carking care and grief and fear;”32 and 
Lucretius warns of not imputing “to the eyes this fault of the mind.”33 Therefore, due 
to emotions, the mind is fallible, but the senses must be trusted. Indeed, perhaps one 
                                                
29 “certe ex vivo Centauri non fit imago, 
nulla fuit quoniam talis natura animalis; 
verum ubi equi atque hominis casu convenit imago, 
haerescit facile extemplo, quod diximus ante, 
propter subtilem naturam et tenvia texta” (DRN IV.739-43). 
30 New fragment 1, from Chilton (1971: 125). 
31 Fragment 7, from Chilton (1971: 5-6). 
32 “Sic animum curas acris luctumque metumque” (DRN III.461). 
33 “Proinde animi vitium hoc oculis adfingere noli” (DRN IV.386). 
P. Jackson  7 
has no choice but to trust in the senses.34 And to return to Lucretius’ theory on vision, 
he writes that, of images, “there are others which arise of themselves in this part of 
the sky called the air.”35 Here, Lucretius describes images that seem to arise 
spontaneously, and do not have their origins in anything real or tangible. However, I 
interpret this as suggesting how things can be misconstrued, as the section 
immediately following suggests how clouds can seem to take the shape of monsters, 
rather than suggesting that images can arise out of nothing, for “nothing is produced 
from nothing”36 in Epicurean physics. 
Considering the latter reference, Lucretius suggests that the image seen by the 
eye is true, but that the mind interprets it falsely, and so this agrees with the former 
reference. But, if the gods can only be perceived by the mind, how can one be sure 
that these images are not also false? This is a very difficult area, and the Epicureans 
seem to simply distinguish between dreams, ghosts and misinterpretations on the 
one hand, and visions of gods on the other. 
And a further issue presents itself when one considers the gods continuously 
losing atoms in producing this continuous stream of images, if one is to consider the 
visions of gods as being real. Is there a point where a god might lose all of its 
constituent atoms? My notion of replenishment, whereby the Epicurean gods can 
replenish lost atoms with like-for-like material from the surrounding intermundia, 
µετακοσµίοι, would alleviate this; moreover, the very nature of the gods, composed of 
very tenuous atoms, would limit the amount of atoms that could be lost anyway, in 
their avoidance of, and thus reducing of, collisions; and the physiological 
compatibility of similar atoms, with the Epicurean gods only being composed of two 
types of atoms, one soul-atom and one body-atom, would also increase their 
                                                
34 DRN IV.469ff 
35 “Sunt etiam quae sponte sua gignuntur et ipsa 
constituuntur in hoc caelo qui dicitur aer” (DRN IV.131-2). 
36 “nullam rem e nilo gigni” (DRN I.150). 
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resistance. But regardless, is there a point where a god might have replenished all of 
its original atoms, bringing to mind the Ship of Theseus paradox,37 as to whether the 
god was still the same god as he once was? I had originally concluded that he would 
be, in terms of continuity. However, Demetrius Lacon, in questioning how it can be 
that memories, which are atomic, can be retained if there were a constant 
interchange of atoms, concludes “that memories are kept;”38 and what is more, “it is 
possible for a certain number of bodies to be kept.”39 So, by extension, gods could 
always retain some of their original self, and thus identity. 
Some, though, do not think of the visions of gods as being real. Sedley (1998: 
66) suggests that the gods are merely thought-constructs, and do not really exist as 
living beings, alive in the universe. Stallings (2007: ix) perhaps has Sedley in mind 
when he writes that “some think that he (Epicurus) believed them (gods) to exist 
merely as concepts.” And each echoes Strodach (1963: 51), writing that “the gods 
perform. This function is ethical; they are paragons of the good life, exemplifying in 
their own existence the highest Epicurean ideals.” Merlan (1960: 50) questions 
whether it is “not entirely possible that they were ready to invoke Zeus and all the 
other divinities of popular religion, not to insure their benevolence but just to express 
their admiration for these perfect beings?” 
I would not entirely agree with any of these stances: although the Epicurean 
gods were not benevolent; did not receive beneficence; did not listen to or heed 
humans; and were not interested in or need humans; however, indirectly, these very 
gods could induce pleasure and pain in humans, and it was through πρόληψις and 
                                                
37 “The ship on which Theseus sailed with the youths and returned in safety, the thirty-oared 
galley, was preserved by the Athenians down to the time of Demetrius Phalereus. They took 
away the old timbers from time to time, and put new and sound ones in their places, so that 
the vessel became a standing illustration for the philosophers in the mooted question of 
growth, some declaring that it remained the same, others that it was not the same vessel” 
(Plutarch’s Lives I, Theseus, XXIII, 1, in Perrin, B. (trans.), 1967). 
38 “τὰς µνήµας φυλάττεσθα[ι]” (XIII). 
39 “δυνατόν ἐστι φυλάττεσ]θαι ποσὰ τῶν σωµάτων” (XII). 
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πρόληψις alone that this was possible and occurred. For, beholding these gods, their 
remove, being free from pain, living in ἀταραξία, in contemplation and meditation, the 
Epicureans could try to imitate these gods. In this way the gods were ethically and 
morally valuable. However, if this belief stemmed from a falsehood, that the gods 
they imitated did not actually exist, then the belief itself would be inherently flawed. 
Therefore the Epicureans must have believed that these gods existed. Furthermore, 
these gods had a sizeable effect upon the daily lives of the Epicureans, and their 
piety, as Philodemus informs us at great length in his De pietate of Epicurus’ 
activities, worshipping in the temple, encouraging the same of his disciples, and 
indeed even writing about the virtues of piety himself. 
Therefore, despite the Epicurean theories on physics, the mind, vision, ghosts, 
dreams and misinterpretation, I do not think that their theory on πρόληψις is harmed. 
I think that πρόληψις does, for Epicureans, convey the true image of existing gods. It 
does not contradict Epicurean physics, and it is not a misinterpretation or a false 
vision. This vision of gods is distinct from vision via the eyes, from dreams and from 
purposeful thoughts, and is only purposefully falsified by religio. And given that 
πρόληψις represents empirical truth, these gods can be, and indeed were, 
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